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APPLYING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO CHEMICAL AND
PHYSICAL RESTRAINT CASES:  IS THE GOVERNMENT GOING
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On August 6, 2002, Jeanne W. Price, a 79-year-old Alzheimer’s patient
at the Central Montgomery Medical Center (CMMC), died while in a
restraining device called a Posey vest.  The CMMC staff used the restraint to
keep Ms. Price from wandering the halls of the medical center by confining
her in bed.1  When the patient later attempted to get out of bed, she slipped off
the side, causing the vest to tighten around her chest.2  She soon died of
asphyxiation.  An attorney for the family stated that the patient may have been
left unattended for up to an hour.3
The incident at CMMC prompted an investigation by the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) into the use of restraints on patients at CMMC.
The investigation cited a systemic abuse of chemical and physical restraints,
contrary to the standard of care set forth in the Medicare statute.4  Based on
the findings, the DOJ issued subpoenas and threatened suit against CMMC for
violations of the civil False Claims Act (FCA).5  In 2002, CMMC settled the
case, agreeing to pay the federal government $200,000, institute new
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standards, and submit itself to monitoring by an agreed-upon third party
consultant.6
The deaths or injuries suffered by residents of nursing homes and
hospitals provoke an emotive response from society.  Inevitably, the public
calls for retribution against the hospital or nursing home.  Beginning with
amendments to the civil False Claims Act in the 1980s that eased the burden
of bringing claims against medical providers, the government began to use this
statute to punish hospitals and nursing homes for claims of substandard care.7
However, the use of the FCA as it currently stands raises many policy
problems, especially when applied to cases involving chemical and physical
restraints.  This article will examine the history and elements of the FCA and
how it has been applied in the health care context.  It will also analyze the
benefits and drawbacks of using the FCA in health care cases, and determine
how a court would decide a case based on the use of restraints.  It will argue
that, for a number of policy and procedural reasons, the FCA should not be
extended to cover cases involving chemical and physical restraints.  Finally,
it will explore possible solutions to the policy problems raised by the Act and
alternative means of obtaining justice.
HISTORY OF THE FCA
Known originally as “Lincoln’s Law,” the FCA was enacted in 1863 to
deter and punish those who submitted false bills to the government for
supplies never sent to Union troops and for overbilling of supplies actually
sent.8  “For sugar it often got sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, something no
better than brown paper; [and] for sound horses and mules, spavined beasts
and dying donkeys. . . .”9  The original statute contained a qui tam provision
to encourage private individuals, known as relators, to report alleged fraud to
the government with the possibility of earning a reward in the form of a
portion of the government’s winnings, usually around 15%.10  When a relator
brings a qui tam action, the government is given sixty days to decide whether
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it will intervene in the case and take over as the prosecution.11  If the
government does not intervene, the relator can still pursue a suit under the
FCA.12  However, if the government decides to enter the suit, the “relator’s
direct involvement with the case virtually ceases.”13
Most early amendments to the FCA were unfriendly to the relator, and as
a result, few qui tam actions were brought until the 1980s.14  The FCA was
amended in 1986 to expand its scope, due to concerns over “rising government
fraud, especially in the areas of defense contracting and health care
benefits.”15  These amendments were designed to encourage qui tam relators
by increasing the relator’s share of winnings to 25%-30% and enhance their
ability to bring and assist in cases by lowering the burden of proof, increasing
the penalties, and allowing a relator to stay in a suit even when the
government intervened.16
ELEMENTS OF THE FCA
A FCA claim such as the cases against CMMC is brought under section
(a)(1) of the FCA, which imposes liability on a person who “knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United
States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval is
liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty. . . .”17  Courts have
interpreted this section as five discrete elements:  “(1) A claim (2) submitted
to the U.S. government (3) which is false or fraudulent (4) with sufficient
knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the claim (5) constituting a
negative and direct effect on the federal treasury.”18
A claim submitted to the U.S. government under the Medicare statute has
been interpreted as a single submission form.19  If a provider misinterprets a
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rule or regulation and submits a number of bills with the same mistake for
reimbursement, each bill will be subjected to a separate penalty.20  The
penalties are assessed as a set amount for each false claim (ranging from
$5,500 to $11,000), plus three times the amount of damages to the
government.21
However, a bill will only be subject to penalty if it is found to be false.
Case law holds that falsity of a claim implies an attempt to deceive.22
However, the choice of bad methodologies may cross the line and render the
providers’ claim false.23  Falsity in the health care context is most easily found
where a bill for services not performed is submitted.  Obviously, the non-
performance of a service constitutes a false claim for reimbursement when the
bill is presented to the government.  However, falsity has also been found
based on a theory of supplying worthless or substandard products.24
To prove the products and care provided is substandard, the proponent of
the false claim must show that the product or care was not worth the amount
billed to Medicare.25  In proving this, a proponent will rely on the standards
set forth in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, applicable to nursing
homes under the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA), or the Conditions of
Participation of the Medicare statute applicable to hospitals.26  To participate
in Medicare, all providers must submit applications stating that services were
performed as billed and sign off on a clause recognizing that any
misrepresentations will make the provider liable under the Medicare statute.27
In United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, the Court found that by submitting
bills, providers implicitly certify to the government that they are abiding by
applicable statutes, rules, and regulations requiring the provision of
appropriate quality of care and safety.28  This theory of implied certification
is used to find liability under the FCA for substandard care.  If the court finds
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that a provider is not upholding its end of the deal under the NHRA or
Conditions of Participation requirements for quality care, the court can find
the provider liable under the FCA, since it has implicitly certified by
presenting bills to the government.  For example, in United States v. NHC
Health Care Corp., the court held, “[a]t some very blurry point, a provider of
care can cease to maintain this standard by failing to perform the minimum
necessary care activities required to promote the patient’s quality of life.
When the provider reaches that point, and still presents claims for
reimbursement to Medicare, the provider has simply committed fraud against
the United States.”29  Simply stated, the theory underlying a substandard care
FCA case is that a provider who is not providing adequate care (as set forth
in the NHRA and the Conditions of Participation) is submitting a false claim
each and every time it presents a bill for substandard care to the government.
Additionally, a showing that a provider violated statutory or regulatory
standards of care is evidence of the worthlessness of services, though not
necessarily per se evidence.30  Determination of falsity may turn on value of
services provided.31  Applicable health care standards may include having
sufficient numbers of staff, providing assistance in activities of daily living,
providing wound care and disease monitoring, and preventing falls, bedsores,
and weight loss.32
Knowledge under the FCA includes actual knowledge, deliberate
ignorance of the truth, and reckless disregard of the truth.33  Reckless
disregard of the truth has been interpreted as an extension of, and closely
related to, gross negligence.34  The proponent of a suit under the FCA is not
required to prove specific intent.35  By submitting a claim to Medicare, a
provider is imputed with knowledge of all rules and regulations associated
with making claims, and therefore has “few defenses to the knowledge
requirement.”36  Whether the knowledge of the amount and type of care given
can be imputed to the provider is a difficult question.  In NHC Health Care
Corp., the Court held that knowledge of substandard care can be imputed if
a jury could find the nursing homes did not have a sufficient staff to properly
768 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:763
37. See NHC Health Care Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1058.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Fabrinkant, supra note 16, at 111; Straus, 274 F.3d at 695.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
care for residents under the terms of its Medicare agreement.37  The Court
maintained that the FCA “allows a jury to find knowledge based on deliberate
indifference or reckless disregard for the truth,” and acknowledged that this
conclusion could be inferred from evidence of shortages in the staff and the
neglect of the residents.38  The Court subsequently held:
an entity who is charging the Government for a minimum amount of care provided to its
residents should question whether understaffing might lead to undercare.  The knowledge
of the answer to that question is charged to the Defendants when they submitted their
Medicare and Medicaid claim forms.  In other words, a jury could reasonably find that
NHC should have known if they were failing to provide all necessary care . . . at the time
they submitted their claims for reimbursement.39
In a physical and chemical restraint case under the FCA, the government
(or the relator) must prove all five elements of a FCA case.  The proponent of
the suit must show that the provider submitted a claim for reimbursement to
the government.40  The proponent of the suit will also have to prove that the
claim is false, typically by showing that the use of restraints by the provider
was not in compliance with the NHRA or the Conditions of Participation.41
The knowledge element is usually easy to prove, as most providers who
receive reimbursements from Medicare are imputed with the knowledge of the
statute, rules, and regulations.42  However, the proponent will have to prove
that the provider knew or should have known about the abuse of restraints.43
Since an abuse of restraints would mean that the government is paying for a
higher quality of care than the patient is receiving, a negative effect on the
federal treasury can be implied.
PENALTIES
Under the FCA, each false claim is fined between $5,000 and $10,000—
the exact amount is left to the judge’s discretion—plus three times the amount
of damages that the government sustains due to the false claim.44  However,
in 1999, the DOJ issued a final rule that the initial fine is increased to $5,500
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to $11,000 for each false claim made to the government.45  While in many
health care claims the actual damage to the government may be pennies, an
initial penalty of at least $5,000 per claim filed means that the fine to the
provider can be astronomical.46  Since the Medicare statute has its own
liability provision, a provider can also be liable and subject to a separate
penalty under provisions in the Medicare statute for a false claim for
reimbursement.47
THE FCA AS APPLIED TO HEALTH CARE CASES
Since the 1980s, the FCA has been used by imaginative federal
prosecutors to punish and deter a wide array of crimes, including health care
fraud.48  One of the first successful substandard care suits by the federal
government was United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric
Centers of Oklahoma, Inc., in which the DOJ brought a FCA action against a
psychiatric hospital.49  The government alleged that “appropriate precautions
were not taken and that physical injury to and sexual abuse of patients
occurred because of inadequate conditions, such as understaffed shifts, lack
of monitoring equipment, and inappropriate housing assignments.”50
Therefore, the government maintained that the failure of the defendant to
provide a safe and quality environment violated the FCA.51  This violation of
the FCA rested on the facility’s implied certification that the billings
presented to the government complied with the Medicaid statutes and
regulations in submitting bills under the program.52  The court agreed with the
government and found that defendant violated the FCA by submitting bills for
770 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:763
53. Id.
54. See David R. Hoffman, The Federal False Claims Act As a Remedy to Poor Care, FALSE
CLAIMS ACT AND QUI TAM, Q. REV., July 1996, at 17, 21-22 (citing Complaint, United States v. GMS
Management-Tucker, Inc., Civ. A. No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
55. Id. at 17.
56. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (2000).
58. See Hoffman, supra note 54, at 17.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 20-22.
61. See Settlement, supra note 4, at 1.
62. Id.
procedures that were not performed to the standard of care set forth in the
Medicare statute.53
Reasoning similar to Aranda was applied in a consent decree between the
DOJ and GMS Management-Tucker, Inc. for care given in the Tucker House
Nursing Home.54  The U.S. government filed a complaint against GMS
Management-Tucker, Inc. due to reports of poor wound care and malnutrition
at the Tucker Home under the theory that the care given was below the
standard set in the NHRA.55  The allegations of false claims arose from the
accounts of three patients in the home who all lost extreme amounts of weight
and developed severe decubitus ulcers (bedsores).56  The NHRA requires
nursing homes that receive Medicare payments to abide by standards such as
maintaining or enhancing the quality of life of residents, providing adequate
nutrition and wound care, and providing for the physical and psychological
well-being of residents.57  The theory advanced by the government was that
the nursing home signed off on an agreement with the government certifying
that the care provided comported with the bills submitted.58  The government
alleged when the nursing home sought reimbursement for services that did not
meet the statutory standard of care, it was submitting claims in violation of the
FCA.59  In February of 1996, the owners and operators of the nursing home
agreed to a $600,000 penalty to settle the claim and entered into a consent
order that mandated monitoring and reporting by all facilities owned by GMS-
Tucker.60
In the CMMC case, the government utilized the same theory of liability
as earlier cases to address the use of chemical and physical restraints.61  The
government relied on the implied certification theory, maintaining that the
medical center agreed to abide by the Conditions of Participation of the
Medicare statute when it submitted bills for reimbursement.62  According to
the government, when CMMC overused chemical and physical restraints and
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continued to present bills to Medicare, it was submitting claims for
substandard care, and therefore violated the FCA.63
BENEFITS OF USING THE FCA IN THE HEALTH CARE ARENA
One of the main arguments made in favor of the use of the FCA against
hospitals and nursing homes is that it reimburses the government for funds
that were improperly obtained by providers.  In 2001 alone, the Office of the
Inspector General estimated that Medicare wrongly overpaid providers by
approximately $12 billion.64  Since the qui tam amendments of 1986, the
government has been able to recoup almost $8 billion.65
Proponents of the use of the FCA against providers also claim that the
ability for individuals with any information on possible FCA violations to
bring suit against a provider facilitates the government’s capacity to address
problems.66  Under the qui tam provision, anyone who possesses original
inside information has standing to bring suit against the provider.67  Since
many of the victims of the substandard care are unable to bring suit due to
logistical or competency concerns, the qui tam provision allows friends or
family of the victim, or staff of the hospital or nursing home to bring suit.
Therefore, the FCA allows individuals who are not the victims themselves to
address standard of care violations.
Along with allowing non-victims of substandard care to bring suit, the
FCA allows suits to be brought in situations where state law actions would
fail.  For example, under state tort law claims, the individual bringing suit
must be able to prove at least negligence on the part of the provider in order
to win.68  Proving negligence may be challenging because of the requirement
of demonstrating proximate causation.  With most of the victims of
substandard care being ill or incompetent, proving that a provider’s
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substandard care led to the harm to the victim by way of the victim’s
testimony is difficult.  Also, many times the victim is not in a condition where
he or she would be able to bring suit.  Many victims do not have access to
outside assistance, nor do they have the requisite mental capacity to bring a
suit alone.69  Under the FCA, the relator, and not the victim, must only show
that the care given was not up to par with the relevant statute.
Furthermore, the high penalties that are mandated by the FCA serve as a
strong deterrent to hospitals and nursing homes.  Under the theory of
deterrence, a provider will be sure that it is following the standards set out in
federal statute to avoid the enormous penalties under the Act.  As stated by
Assistant U.S. attorney David Hoffman, “the use of the False Claims Act is
another weapon available to the government to combat inappropriate behavior,
and it will be pointed at those who choose profits over good care. . . .”70
Therefore, the use of the FCA may also encourage nursing homes and
hospitals to provide quality care to avoid the threat of penalties.
Proponents of using the FCA against health care providers point to
examples such as the one from Chippenham Manor Nursing Home, a large
nursing home located in Richmond, Virginia.  The home was threatened with
FCA action due to its alleged substandard care, including patients with
“spontaneous skin breakdowns,” and staffing and supplies shortages.71
Shortly after the threat, the home settled with the government.72  In the
settlement, the home agreed to pay $275,000 to the government.  However,
instead of the money going into the Medicare trust as it has with other cases,
the bulk of the money was put toward an approved “restorative plan” to fix the
problems.73  During informal interviews, both residents and staff of the facility
agree that Chippenham has improved since the settlement.  However, this type
of recycling of fines, namely, the use of the settlement money to fund the
improvement of the provider, is exceedingly rare.74
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78. 39 F. Supp. 2d 563, 571 (D. Md. 1998).  Though it mentioned the problems of transfer trauma,
the court denied the nursing home’s petition for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the government
from terminating it’s Medicare participation because it found the Secretary of State had the sole discretion
for termination.
Although the Court is compelled to reach the conclusion that Secretary Shalala through HCFA had
PROBLEMS WITH USING THE FCA IN THE HEALTH CARE ARENA
A number of problems arise when the FCA is used as a sword against
health care providers.  The most glaring are the practical problems of the
astronomical fines imposed by the FCA on providers who are already
struggling to stay afloat, and the strong incentives placed on provider to give
up their cases and settle.  Furthermore, the NHRA and the Conditions of
Participation are written in aspirational legislative language that does not
translate well to real-world practice.  Apart from the practical problems, a
number of theoretical problems also emerge when the FCA is taken out of its
original context. 
The most obvious problem with using the FCA as a punishment to
nursing homes and hospitals that are allegedly falling under the appropriate
standard of care is that the fines imposed upon the providers can be ruinous.
For most providers, operating on razor-thin profit or, in the case of many
community hospitals, no profit, the imposition of the penalties will gravely
affect their ability to continue to care for their patients.75  Many of the
providers who are subject to FCA action are “dependant on federal funding
. . . [and] face the Herculean task of improving quality of care and strictly
complying with burdensome regulations, all while government reimbursement
rates are diminishing.”76  The enormous FCA penalties have the potential to
shut down facilities.  “While closing the doors of a facility providing ‘inferior’
services is beneficial to the residents, bankrupting the facilities and the
consequential damage that could occur from transferring the residents may not
be the appropriate ends to justify the means.”77  In Northern Health Facilities,
Inc. v. United States, the court held that the risk of “‘transfer trauma’ resulting
in severe psychological, emotional, and physical damage due to this closure”
to the residents of the facility was substantial and should be a weighty
consideration when a facility closure may occur.78
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FCA litigation and penalties, even if they do not force a facility to close,
may threaten the adequacy of resources available to the facility to dedicate to
patient care and improve quality of care.79  The seemingly elegant solution for
providers of dropping out of the Medicare program is usually a financially
impossible undertaking, as many hospital and nursing home residents are
covered by Medicare and the facilities depend on the reimbursements.80
Problems arise even if the provider settles the FCA claim with the
government.  Most of the FCA cases against hospitals and nursing homes end
in settlement, as the provider may favor a lesser financial burden and a
reduced risk settling the claim outside of court.81  Therefore, the providers are
often induced to settle with the government, even when they have a good
chance of winning, because their potential liability is so great.  The
government accedes to settlement because “the FCA only provides leverage
for the government to recoup money in its current thrust under health care
fraud and abuse initiatives,” and with settlement, the government is
guaranteed some type of remuneration.82  Healthcare providers have argued
that the power the government has in generating settlements is coercive,
stunningly similar to extortion.83  Apart from the providers paying the
government for claims that they might win, the high rate of settlement
discourages clarification in the law.
[S]ettlement removes many factual and legal issues from judicial scrutiny, it precludes
a provider from arguing a range of issues that are crucial both to the development of FCA
jurisprudence and to the underlying regulatory policy . . . [w]hat results . . . is an
amorphous collection of quasi-legal guidance with no precedential value, on which the
government will happily rely in future enforcement efforts.84
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Another major problem with using the FCA in health care cases is that the
standards set out in the NHRA and the Conditions of Participation are at best
aspirational, and at worst vague and unrealistic.  The standards laid out by the
government are “general requirements but are not specific as to the content of
those requirements.”85  Even the Aranda court in upholding the use of the
FCA against a hospital noted that “[i]t may be easier for a maker of widgets
to determine whether its product meets contract specifications than for a
hospital to determine whether its services meet ‘professionally recognized
standards for health care.’”86  Thus, under the FCA, the government is able to
penalize providers with huge sums of money under statutes that are subjective
and unclear.
Furthermore, “[t]he mere specter of allowing health care quality issues to
form the basis of an FCA prosecution is a federal court’s nightmare.”87  That
is, if a FCA case reaches court instead of settling, judges will have the duty of
determining the proper standards of care, rather than health professionals.
Because no concrete guidance nor precedent exists in this area, judges will
have free reign in setting standards of health care.
The qui tam provision has its own drawbacks for use in the health care
area.  With a possibility of gaining up to 30% of the winnings and little
discouragement to bring all claims, a relator has the incentive to bring suit
against providers, even where there is little evidence or de minimis violations.
The FCA attempts to deter such behavior by relators by awarding attorney’s
fees to the defendant when “the Government does not proceed with the action
and the person bringing the action conducts the action . . . [and the] defendant
prevails in the action and the court finds that the claim of the person bringing
the action was clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for
purposes of harassment.”88  As interpreted by the Ninth Circuit Court, “[a]n
action is clearly frivolous when the result is obvious or the appellant’s
arguments of error are wholly without merit.  An action is clearly vexatious
or brought primarily for purposes of harassment when the plaintiff pursues the
litigation with an improper purpose, such as to annoy or embarrass the
defendant.”89  However, this finding is difficult to establish in a suit against
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a health care provider as the standards that the suits are brought under (the
NHRA and the Conditions of Participation) are vague and aspirational.
Another troubling problem with prosecuting health care providers under
the FCA is the potential for an “uncoordinated effort” by governmental
agencies to “subject[] [the provider] to multiple assaults for the same
conduct. . . .”90  Because of the enforcement provisions in NHRA, a nursing
home can be subject to double liability.  Consequently, a particularly troubling
result was reached in Northern Health Facilities v. United States.91  Both the
DOJ and the Health Care Financing Agency (now the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services) brought suit against Greenbelt Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center (Greenbelt) for violations of the FCA and violations of
the NHRA, respectively.  The court upheld the uncoordinated attempt by the
two federal agencies when it denied injunctive relief from termination from
Medicare under the NHRA, even after the nursing home entered into a
settlement agreement with the DOJ to pay penalties and improve its quality of
care.92  Though the court found that the imposition of penalties under the
NHRA after entering into the consent decree with the DOJ was unfair and
against the public interest, the court held that both agencies had a right to sue
Greenbelt under the repetitive statutes.93
A theoretical concern about the use of the FCA in the health care context
is that it is being used to punish and deter offenders.94  However, the FCA is
a civil statute.  Society uses criminal law, not civil law, to punish and deter
conduct.95  One scholar has argued that
[w]hile the criminal law has little reason to fear overdeterrence . . . within its appropriate
domain, the same cannot be said of civil laws such as the FCA.  The overextension of
punitive prohibitions is most troubling when the underlying violation is essentially a
regulatory offense, or noncompliance with one of the growing number of regulations
promulgated by administrative agencies.96
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Finally, one must look to the original intent of the law.  The FCA was
written to deter false billings to the federal government during the Civil War.
The authors of the statute were concerned with overpaying for artillery and
receiving useable supplies for the Union troops.  The statute has now been
taken out of its original context of straightforward billing and put into the
fuzzy realm of quality of care in health care facilities.  Since the federal
government already has statutes in place to prosecute facilities directly for
poor quality of care, such as the NHRA, using an out of place Civil War relic
to punish providers seems, at best, duplicative.
APPLYING THE FCA TO PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL RESTRAINT CASES
The case against CMMC for restraining Ms. Price up to the moment of
her death never generated a formal complaint, nor did it go through any type
of litigation procedures.  Therefore, its precedential value is non-existent.  A
court receiving a FCA suit based solely on the alleged overuse of chemical
and physical restraints would be writing on practically a blank slate.  The
major question for a restraints-only suit would involve how a court would
merge with or distinguish from the Aranda model.
However, in Aranda, the court did not have to delve deeply into health
care standards because the facility’s care was glaringly and unreasonably
poor.  The patients at the facility were under little supervision, which lead to
physical and sexual abuse.97  Since Aranda and NHC Healthcare Corp., which
followed Aranda’s holding without expansion or distinction, were the first and
only cases where a federal court addressed the merits of a quality of care claim
under the FCA, the door is wide open for a case in which the court would have
to interpret standards of care with respect to restraints.
The major reason for the employment of chemical and physical restraints
on patients in hospitals and nursing homes is to promote patient safety and
prevent falls.98  Falls and their related injuries are the reason behind many
lawsuits against these providers.99  Though patients who fall may sue the
nursing home or hospital for negligently failing to use proper restraints, the
provider must make sure not to over-restrain patients.  Therefore, the provider
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(3) The use of a restraint must be—
(i) Selected only when other less restrictive measures have been found to be ineffective
to protect the patient or others from harm;
(ii) In accordance with the order of a physician or other licensed independent
practitioner permitted by the State and hospital to order a restraint.  This order must—
(A) Never be written as a standing or on an as needed basis (that is, PRN); and
(B) Be followed by consultation with the patient’s treating physician, as soon as possible,
if the restraint is not ordered by the patient’s treating physician;
(iii) In accordance with a written modification to the patient’s plan of care;
(iv) Implemented in the least restrictive manner possible;
(v) In accordance with safe and appropriate restraining techniques; and
(vi) Ended at the earliest possible time.
(4) The condition of the restrained patient must be continually assessed, monitored, and
reevaluated.
(5) All staff who have direct patient contact must have ongoing education and training in
the proper and safe use of restraints.
is put into a precarious situation between being the target of negligence suits
and FCA suits for substandard care due to overuse of restraints.
Both the NHRA and the Conditions of Participation contain provisions
dealing with the use of chemical and physical restraints on patients.100  The
NHRA mandates the
right to be free from physical or mental abuse, corporal punishment, involuntary
seclusion, and any physical or chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or
convenience and not required to treat the resident’s medical symptoms.  Restraints may
only be imposed (I) to ensure the physical safety of the resident or other residents, and
(II) only upon the written order of a physician that specifies the duration and
circumstances under which the restraints are to be used. . . .101
The Conditions of Participation are more detailed, but carry the same theme
that restraints are only to be used in the least restrictive manner and only on
the directions of a physician.102  These provisions were written in response to
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(f) Standard:  Seclusion and restraint for behavior management.
(1) The patient has the right to be free from seclusion and restraints, of any form, imposed as
a means of coercion, discipline, convenience, or retaliation by staff.  The term “restraint”
includes either a physical restraint or a drug that is being used as a restraint.  A physical restraint
is any manual method or physical or mechanical device, material, or equipment attached or
adjacent to the patient’s body that he or she cannot easily remove that restricts freedom of
movement or normal access to one’s body.  A drug used as a restraint is a medication used to
control behavior or to restrict the patient’s freedom of movement and is not a standard treatment
for the patient’s medical or psychiatric condition.  Seclusion is the involuntary confinement of
a person in a room or an area where the person is physically prevented from leaving.
(2) Seclusion or a restraint can only be used in emergency situations if needed to ensure the
patient’s physical safety and less restrictive interventions have been determined to be
ineffective.
(3) The use of a restraint or seclusion must be—
(i) Selected only when less restrictive measures have been found to be ineffective to protect
the patient or others from harm;
(ii) In accordance with the order of a physician or other licensed independent practitioner
permitted by the State and hospital to order seclusion or restraint.  The following
requirements will be superseded by existing State laws that are more restrictive:
(A) Orders for the use of seclusion or a restraint must never be written as a standing order
or on an as needed basis (that is, PRN).
(B) The treating physician must be consulted as soon as possible, if the restraint or seclusion
is not ordered by the patient’s treating physician.
(C) A physician or other licensed independent practitioner must see and evaluate the need
for restraint or seclusion within 1 hour after the initiation of this intervention.
(D) Each written order for a physical restraint or seclusion is limited to 4 hours for adults;
2 hours for children and adolescents ages 9 to 17; or 1 hour for patients under 9.  The
original order may only be renewed in accordance with these limits for up to a total of 24
hours.  After the original order expires, a physician or licensed independent practitioner (if
allowed under State law) must see and assess the patient before issuing a new order.
(iii) In accordance with a written modification to the patient’s plan of care;
(iv) Implemented in the least restrictive manner possible;
(v) In accordance with safe appropriate restraining techniques; and
(vi) Ended at the earliest possible time.
(4) A restraint and seclusion may not be used simultaneously unless the patient is—
(i) Continually monitored face-to-face by an assigned staff member; or
(ii) Continually monitored by staff using both video and audio equipment.  This monitoring
must be in close proximity the patient.
(5) The condition of the patient who is in a restraint or in seclusion must continually be
assessed, monitored, and reevaluated.
(6) All staff who have direct patient contact must have ongoing education and training in
the proper and safe use of seclusion and restraint application and techniques and alternative
methods for handling behavior, symptoms, and situations that traditionally have been treated
through the use of restraints or seclusion.
(7) The hospital must report to CMS any death that occurs while a patient is restrained or
in seclusion, or where it is reasonable to assume that a patient’s death is a result of restraint
or seclusion.
evidence that nursing homes and hospitals were leaving patients restrained for
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days at a time, mainly for convenience due to understaffing problems.103
Particularly in the nursing home context, anecdotes about perpetually
restrained patients with decubitus ulcers so deep that an observer could see
bone were common.104
In CMMC, the government maintained that the overuse of chemical and
physical restraints fell into the “substandard care” category of FCA cases.
That is, the case would fall into the theory in Aranda that the government is
not getting what it is paying for when it reimburses providers who use
restraints in violation of the standards set forth in the NHRA and Conditions
of Participation.  Under a claim for substandard care, the government would
have to show that the provider knowingly submitted a claim that was false,
and that the claim adversely affected the Treasury.105
Even if the government could prove that the claim was submitted
knowingly, the problem with this type of case arises in the term “false.”  With
respect to chemical and physical restraint cases, what is interpreted to
constitute falsity is exceedingly important to the outcome of the case.  To
determine falsity, the deciding court will be faced with the task of interpreting
the standards of conduct set forth in the NHRA and the Conditions of
Participation.  The District Court in Aranda stated that even though the
standards are vague, a court should not be barred from determining that an
FCA violation exists.106  Therefore, a court faced with a chemical or physical
restraint case will likely follow this precedent and decide on the merits.
The deciding court will be challenged with the duty of examining the
facts of the case and determining if the facts fit within the standard of care.
In an egregious case of restraint, especially where no physician orders existed,
a court could easily decide in favor of the government.  However, in a closer
case, the court would have to be making decisions that are normally left to a
physician.  (How long should restraints be used?  What type of restraint is the
least restrictive for a patient’s condition?  Is the patient a danger to himself or
to others?)  The outcome of the case would be dependent on the answers to the
above questions and other similar ones.  Thus, the inquiry would be fact-
intensive and, “as a practical matter, the deck is stacked in the defendant’s
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favor:  while the government’s proof is likely to consist of experts who merely
review patient files, the defendant can offer detailed recollections of each
patient’s special circumstances.”107  Therefore, if a close case would avoid
settlement, the provider would probably be able to prevail on the merits.
POLICY REASONS AGAINST USING THE FCA TO PROSECUTE
RESTRAINT CASES
The fact-intensive nature of a close restraint case brings up a major issue:
Should judges be making decisions that are normally left to physicians?  The
standards of care set out in the NHRA and the Conditions of Participation are
well meaning, but give the individuals who work in nursing homes and
hospitals very little guidance in day-to-day activities.  Where the government
mandates are unclear, it does not seem fair or reasonable to impose high
penalties for technical non-compliance.  “The phrase ‘known to be false’ . . .
does not mean ‘scientifically untrue’; it means ‘a lie.’  The Act is concerned
with ferreting out ‘wrongdoing,’ not scientific errors.”108  Therefore, if a
facility used restraints believing them to be in the best interest of a patient and
under a physician’s orders, and submitted bills to the government for the care,
the facility should not be punished.
As stated above, the FCA was not designed to deal with health care
claims, and it should not be used in chemical and physical restraint cases, at
least not in its current form.  Due to the qui tam provision, it is exceedingly
easy for a relator to bring a suit alleging overuse of restraints.  Because the
standards set forth in the statutes are so vague, a relator has every incentive to
bring a suit on the chance it would settle or a court would find for the
government.  Therefore, resources that should be going toward patient care are
spent fending off what amounts to frivolous claims.  Furthermore, even if a
facility is using the restraints properly, it has a large incentive to settle the suit
before the action ever reaches court.  As judges would be interpreting the
standards, many providers fear losing suit even when they are medically
correct in their use of restraining devices.  Here again, resources that should
be used within the facility are diverted.
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RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS
Nursing home and hospital patients always have the ability to bring suit
under state law claims such as medical malpractice, fraud, and battery.  Many
states have enacted legislation making inadequate care, abuse, and neglect
crimes.109  These causes of action may not necessitate a vulnerable segment
of society to bring suit against the facility in charge of its care, as many states
are requiring the staff of hospitals and nursing homes to bring forward
possible cases of abuse and neglect.110
Furthermore, scholars and some states are turning to a theory of absolute
liability when dealing with elder abuse.111  According to one scholar, “[i]n
cases involving defendants who violate . . . laws protecting vulnerable groups,
courts have held these statutes to be essentially strict liability provisions
requiring defendants to safeguard such individuals from foreseeable harm.  To
allow common law defenses would undermine the legislative purpose in
enacting these laws.”112  Therefore, in the states that uphold absolute liability
for vulnerable populations, defenses such as contributory negligence and
assumption of risk will not apply.
With the sheer magnitude of problems raised by the FCA when applied
to health care cases, it should no longer be utilized in this area.  The problem
of overcharging Medicare can be managed under the Medicare statute, and the
problem of substandard care can be handled under state law, especially if all
states adopt mandatory reporting provisions.  However, because of the
emotional response to inferior nursing home and hospital care and a general
feeling of “needing to do something,” the FCA will probably continue to be
applied to these cases.  In this situation, the FCA should be modified to take
into account that it is now used for health care in addition to its original intent
of war supplies.  The best across-the-board solution is to add a separate
provision to cover the burgeoning field of health care claims.  This new
provision would apply to all providers who are qualified to receive
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reimbursement from the government under the Medicare program and actually
submit bills for reimbursement.  It would retain the same definitions for
knowledge and falsity as the original Act, but would provide for different
penalties.  The provision would first set a minimum amount that the claim
submitted must exceed before penalties are imposed, so that providers are not
punished for claims that are off by pennies.  Under the new provision,
however, providers whose claims are under the statutory minimum will
receive warnings and may be penalized after a specified number of warnings
on the same mistake.  The damages recoverable by the government would also
be decreased substantially, and at least 90% of the money recovered would
have to be put into a trust fund for the provider to aid it in improving its
services.  Providers who are cited for using an excessive amount of physical
and chemical restraints will be required to use a majority of the trust money
to hire more well-qualified staff.
If a statutory solution is not feasible, or in conjunction with a new
statutory provision, courts should be given more discretion in setting the
penalties under the FCA.  Since each claim, which may only have deprived the
government of pennies, is a separate false claim, providers are subject to huge
penalties with the $5,500 minimum fine per claim.  Instead of mandating an
initial penalty, judges should be given discretion in setting the fines and how
they should be later spent.  By having a lower risk of financial ruin, providers
will be more willing to avoid settlement.
Moreover, the burden of proof should be raised so that the government
would have to prove the falsity of the claim by more than a mere
preponderance of the evidence.  Since this statute has already been
acknowledges as a hybrid civil and criminal statute, raising the burden to clear
and convincing evidence or something similar in effect should not be
controversial.
CONCLUSION
The restraint of nursing home and hospital patients raises an emotional
response from individuals and instigates a call for the government to “do
something” to punish and deter providers.  However, punishing providers
through the FCA as it currently stands is causing more problems than it is
solving.
